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would lead to a worsening of the situation in medical practice today, if for no
other reason than what we have seen - he rationalizes abortion on demana.
Therefore, I do not recommend the book. But if you are not familiar with the
contemporary liberal mind, Ackerman's book will abundantly satisfy your curiosity.
- Richard R. Roach, S.J., Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Moral Theology
Marquette University

Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach
to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine
Albert R. Johnsen, Ph.D. ; Mark Siegler, M.D.;
and William J. Winslade, Ph.D., J.D.
Macmillan, New York, 1982, xvii + 187 pp.
This book is designed to be a desk reference in medical ethics for practicing
physicians. It is ordered to the practical resolution of concrete cases that clinicians
frequently face, and it explicitly avoids becoming involved in abstruse theoretical
arguments, ethical theories and speculation. A very well organized book, it enables
physicians to come to ethical judgments in the same manner that they formulate
clinical judgments, for the text employs the contemporary medical clinical diag·
nostic model used in medical practice.
There are many serious problems with this book, the least of which is the belief
that one can adequately analyze ethical situations in a manner analogous to the
way in which clinical problems are analyzed. The practical ethical judgments and
suggestions made in this work are based on a subjective, intuitive, utilitarian and
quality-of-life theory of ethics, and little mention is made of the weaknesses of a
theory such as this. No justification is given for the adoption of this theory of
ethics, and this could easily lead unsuspecting clinical practitioners to believe that
there is general agreement abou t the validity of this theory and the suggestions
derived from it. While this book gives very detailed accounts of specific medical
cases, the moral principles invoked to resolve these cases are often ambiguous and
confused. For example, it is suggested that practitioners ought to respect the
desire of some patients to die with dignity and have active euthanasia imposed on
them. But elsewhere, readers are warned of the legal dangers of becoming involved
in assisting in the death of patients. As a result, the reader is left in a state of
doubt as to whether cooperation in this practice should be offered.
The utilitarian and anti-speculative approach of this work creates serious difficulties for the clinical practitioner. This is because the work assumes that sound
ethical judgments can be reached by a "rough" weighing of the values involved in
specific cases. The problem with this approach is that more than a "rough"
weighing of values is required for sound resolution of the truly difficult ethical
cases. The difficult moral cases, those which seriously challenge the capabilities of
an ethical theory, are those in which the values in conflict are very similar in
nature. It is easy to decide what is to be done when one is deciding between silk
purses and sows' ears. But when one must compare the equally incomparable
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values of two human lives, for instance, a "rough" comparison of values will not
indicate that anyone course of action should be clearly followed. The result of
this is that the ethical theory presented in this book is useless where it is needed
most, in cases where apparently conflictive ethical values are incomparable. The
utilitarian and quality-of-life ethic presented here is incapable of giving any direction
and guidance where guidance and direction are needed most. The usual result of
this is that most wiIl follow their own preferences, prejudices and biases in
situations of critical ethical conflict because no clear reason for choosing anyone
course of action wiIl be offered by the principles.
This work attempts to transform medical-ethical judgments into clinical techniques that are applied to concrete cases in the way that therapeutic techniques
are applied. In so doing, much of the dignity of clinical practice is demeaned
because it reduces the clinician's commitment to the well-being of the patient to
an applied technique that is to be mechanically applied to the various situations
that are presented. This work should be read with caution, as its inadequate
theoretical framework compromises the suggestions made.
- Robert L. Barry, O.P.
Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research Center

What Is Marriage?
Ma"iage in the Catholic Church
Theodore Mackin, S.J.
New York/Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1982, vii + 366 pp., $11.95.
Mackin has written a very interesting and challenging work. The problem with
it, as I hope to show, is that it is predicated upon a misreading both of the Roman
Catholic theological tradition and on the teaching set forth at Vatican Council II.
Mackin's principal claim is that a radically new understanding or definition of
marriage emerged during the second Vatican Council in the pastoral constitutio n,
Gaudium et Spes. This new understanding, which was accepted by Pope Paul VI in
Humanae Vitae, differs profoundly from the understanding of marriage in the
Church from the time of St. Augustine through the great medieval theologians and
regnant during the first part of this century, when it was incorporated into the
1917 Code of Canon Law. The older understanding was challenged during the
1930s by writers like Heribert Doms and Dietrick von Hildebrand, and although
their challenge was rejected by Pope Pius XII, it was precisely their view of
marriage that is central to the teaching of Gaudium et Spes (p. 235). This, I
believe, is an accurate way to summarize the principal claim of the work.
But what, according to Mackin, is the older understanding or definition of
marriage - the one regnant from Augustine until Vatican Council II - and what is
the radically new understanding of marriage set forth in Gaudium et Spes?
According to Mackin, the older view regarded marriage primarily as a contract
between a male and female, obligating them to the pursuit of specific ends. Of
these, the primary end was procreating and e duc ating child ren, while the second
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